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Abstract 
Canada’s Cuba policy has been an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy in the 
last five decades. Generally, during that period Canada’s Cuba policy has been different from 
the US policy. Canada's approach has been to engage with the island through bilateral relations 
instead of isolation and pressures. This Canadian strategy of engagement towards Cuba had its 
heyday during the Chrétien administration in the 1990s through the so-called policy of 
“constructive engagement”. The goal of this approach was to promote democratic change in 
Cuba's political system using cooperation instead of isolation.  
Nonetheless, under Harper the orientation of Canadian foreign policy in general, and 
consequently of Canada’s Cuba policy have evolved towards a different path. Under the 
Conservatives, Canada has attempted to improve its overall relations with the US through closer 
cooperation in the political and defense contexts at the international level, and to avoid frictions 
on conflicting issues that could affect the relationship. The main purpose of this shift is to secure 
the cardinal interests of the Canadian economic elite with its southern neighbor.  
Harper’s Cuba policy is in keeping with his general foreign policy orientation: to refrain 
from pursuing any initiative that implies even a minimal confrontation with Washington. 
Besides, Cuba’s “constructive engagement” belongs more to the so-called middle power 
approach or Liberal internationalist model of Canadian foreign policy, where Ottawa preferred 
to follow a more diplomatic strategy at the international stage. The Harper administration is 
involved in shifting that paradigm, and is not particularly interested in constructive engagement 
even though the policy has not been abandoned officially. 
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Traditionally, Cuba has had a unique place in Canadian foreign policy.  Historically, the 
Canadian position towards the island has been different from that of the United States (US). 
Whereas the American strategy has been to isolate Havana from the rest of the hemisphere 
through the aggressive enforcement of an economic blockade, Canada's approach has been to 
engage with the island through bilateral relations, though there were oscillations in the 
relationship during the last five decades.  
The Canadian strategy towards Cuba, which has been labelled as “constructive 
engagement” by many scholars1,had its heyday during the Chrétien administration in the 
1990s.The goal of this approach was to promote democratic change in Cuba's political system 
using cooperation instead of isolation and pressure. Lana Wylie suggests that “constructive 
engagement” entails a linkage between cooperation and influence:  
While engagement implies regular relations (trade, investment, diplomatic exchanges), 
“constructive engagement” aims to utilize these mechanisms in order to achieve change 
within Cuba’s domestic sphere. The goal of constructive engagement is to use the access 
that comes from regular relations to influence the development of a western style 
economic and political model on the island ... constructive engagement aspires to do this 
through fostering connections with Cubans and quietly encouraging the hoped-for 
changes.2  
 
However, under the government of Stephen Harper, there is evidence of a policy shift 
from “constructive engagement” to a more critical stance towards the island, which is more in 
line with the standard US strategy of isolation.3  Furthermore, Harper’s Cuba policy is in 
                                                          
1 See Peter McKenna AND John M. Kirk, “Through Sun and Ice: Canada, Cuba and Fifty Years of 'Normal' 
Relations,” in Canada Looks South: In Search of an Americas Policy, ed. Peter McKenna (Toronto: University of 
Toronto Press, 2012), “The Chrétien years: Evaluating ‘constructive engagement,’” Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal 16 (2010), “Stephen Harper's Cuba Policy: from Autonomy to Americanization?” Canadian Foreign Policy 
Journal 15.1 (2009); Lana Wylie,”Introduction: Shifting ground: Considering the new realities in the Canadian‐
Cuban relationship,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 16 (2010), “Perceptions and foreign policy: A comparative 
study of Canadian and American policy toward Cuba,” Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 11 (2004), “The Special 
Case of Cuba,” International Journal: Canada's Journal of Global Policy Analysis 67.3 (2012); Paolo Spadoni and 
Julie Sagebien,”Will They Still Love Us Tomorrow? Canada-Cuba Business Relations and the End of the US 
Embargo,” Thunderbird International Business Review 55.1 (2013). 
2 Lana Wylie, “Introduction: Shifting ground: Considering the new realities in the Canadian‐Cuban relationship,” 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 16 (2010): 58.   
3 In her  work, Kalowatie Deonandan also challenged the constructive engagement thesis and noted that there was 
convergence between the Canadian and US policies towards Cuba  even under the Chretien administration when the 
Canadian  government was challenging the US on the Helms-Burton legislation.See Kalowatie Deonandan, “The 
Helms Burton Bill and Canada’s Cuba Policy Convergences with the US”, Policy and Society 24.1 (2005). 
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keeping with his general foreign policy orientation: to refrain from pursuing any initiative that 
either involves or even implies even a minimal confrontation with Washington.  In recent years, 
leading figures in the government and the Prime Minister himself have expressed open criticism 
of Cuba that has been similar in tone to the American criticism.  
1.1 Research Objectives 
          The main purpose of the thesis is to investigate the nature of Canada’s foreign 
policy toward Cuba under the Conservative government headed by Stephen Harper. In 
particular, the thesis will examine to what extent the Harper government’s policy toward Cuba 
represents a radical turning point from the approach of “constructive engagement” that was 
ostensibly implemented by previous Canadian governments.  
1.2 Theoretical Framework 
          The investigation will be guided by a theoretical framework based on Mark 
Neufeld’s hegemonic thesis, 4 which borrows from Cranford Pratt’s dominant class theory5 and 
from the neo-Gramscian approach used by Robert Cox6 to explain international relations. Pratt 
argues that Canada’s foreign policy is determined by the interests of its dominant classes while 
Neufeld draws attention to the global hegemonic order which involves not just the  “dominance 
of one state by other, but rather the institution and maintenance of a world order that serves the 
interests of the dominant class of the dominant state,” and “ the dominant classes of other states 
as well” in the system.7  
 The thesis argues that Canada’s foreign policy has been supportive of US hegemonic 
interests though Canada is able to exercise some degree of independence insofar as this does 
not impinge on the strategic or economic interests of the hegemon.  
1.3 Importance of the Thesis 
During the nineties and the first decade of the 2000s the relations between Canada and 
Cuba generated the publication of numerous academic articles, books and papers in Canada.  
Today the intellectual production on this topic has decreased significantly. Thus, one of the 
                                                          
4 Mark Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis: The Case of Canada as a Middle Power”, in Readings in 
Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas 1st edition, eds. Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha  
(Oxford University Press, 2007), 94-112. 
5 Cranford Pratt, “Dominant Class Theory and Canadian Foreign Policy: The Case of the Counter-Consensus”, 
International Journal 39 (1983): 99-135. 
6 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations: An Essay in Method”  in Gramsci, Historical Materialism 
and International Relations,  ed. Stephen Gill  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993) 
7 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy,” 96. 
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purposes of the thesis is to add to that body of literature and update some topics covered in the 
existing studies.  As the researcher is a scholar of Cuban origin studying in Canada, the thesis 
incorporates a Cuban perspective from the position of someone living in a Canadian academic 
environment. 
1.4 Methodology 
The thesis employs qualitative and quantitative sources. The bulk of the information is 
derived from secondary qualitative sources obtained from books, journals, newspaper articles, 
as well as digital sources, and also from primary sources such as government documents. The 
quantitative sources are related mainly to the statistical analysis of bilateral economic relations. 
Although most of the information is from Canadian and American sources some is from  Cuban 
sources.  
1.5 Organization of the Thesis 
The thesis is organized into six chapters as follows: Chapter one is the present chapter 
which is the Introduction. It lays out the argument of the thesis, the rationale for the study, the 
theoretical framework which guides it and the general organization of the work.   
Chapter two is the theoretical chapter.  It first discusses the traditional approaches 
through which the Canadian foreign policy has been studied historically. It then moves to the 
critical perspectives that challenges the standard middle power model by drawing on more 
radical critiques.   
Chapter three addresses the evolution of Canadian foreign policy under the Harper 
administration, the institutional patterns that affect it and the unavoidable impact of the US-
Canada relations on Ottawa’s foreign policy. In other words, it lays out the close ties between 
Ottawa and Washington and the impact this has over Canadian foreign policy, and which will 
help to inform our understanding of  the Conservatives policy towards Havana.  
 Chapter four presents an overview of Canadian-Cuban relations since the 1960s under 
different Canadian administrations and links these to the “constructive engagement” argument. 
Chapter five is the core chapter of the thesis and it deals with the analysis of Canada’s Cuban 
policy under the Harper government. It assesses the Conservative administration stance towards 
Havana and argues that this relationship does not fit with the “constructive engagement” 
framework.   
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The final chapter is the conclusion. This chapter summarizes the thesis’ findings and 
summarizes the thesis’ main arguments.  
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CHAPTER 2: 
THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY 
In the study of Canadian foreign policy at least three dominant theoretical approaches 
can be identified: the middle power thesis, the principal power argument, and the 
satellite/dependent power framework.8 The middle power thesis is usually associated with the 
liberal internationalist paradigm and which has been the dominant approach in the analysis of 
Canadian foreign policy.9 This approach emerged after the Second World War and it conceives 
of Canada as a middle power playing a constructive and pacifistic role on the international 
stage. According to Erica Simpson, the role of a middle power implies that: 
Canada should seek every opportunity to mediate conflict in order to secure international 
peace … Canada should support international institutions and consistently act in order to 
promote internationalism and collective security … Canada should employ flexibility and 
quiet diplomacy in its interactions with other nations. 10 
 
Historically, liberal internationalism is considered to have had its golden age during the 
1950's and the 1960's. Its roots can be traced to the period of Lester Pearson’s administration 
and particularly Pearson’s role at the United Nations during the Korean crisis in which he 
initiated the idea of a peacekeeping force, and for which he won the Nobel Peace Prize.  
Pearson’s actions won Canada accolades and initiated a burgeoning literature on Canada’ role 
as the international fixer—the liberal internationalist.  
It started to change during the Trudeau years (1968-84) and was eclipsed by the end of 
1980's. 11 It was at this time that a new paradigm of Canadian foreign policy began to takes 
                                                          
8 Maureen Appel Molot, “Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: 
Classic Debates and New Ideas (First Edition), eds. Bratt Duane and Christopher J. Kukucha (Oxford University 
Press, 2007), 62. 
9  One of the first proponents of Liberal Internationalism was John W. Holmes.    See John Holmes, The Shaping of 
Peace: Canada and the Search for World Order, 1943-1957, vols. I and II (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1982). More contemporary scholars associated with the liberal internationalist school include,  Denis Stairs, The 
Diplomacy of Constraint: Canada, the Korean War and the United States (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 
1974) and Andrew F. Cooper,  Richard A. Higgot and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia 
and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993) 
10 Erika Simpson, “The Principles of Liberal Internationalism According to Lester Pearson”, Journal of Canadian 
Studies 34 (1) (1999): 85.  
11 The domination of liberal-international views is inadequate to explain the new trends that have emerged in 
Canadian foreign policy and has given way, in the Trudeau era, to a neo-realist approach.  See David B. Dewitt, and 
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shape—that of Canada as a principal power. It drew its analytical claims from the arguments of 
neorealists in international relations theory.  Briefly stated, neorealists accept that the structure 
of the global order constrains or shapes states behavior.12 The original proponent of this 
approach was James Eayrs,13 but David B. Dewitt and John J. Kirton 14 have been the primary 
drivers of this concept in the last decades. The vision of Canada as a principal power lies in its 
relative rise when compared to a declining American hegemon15 and the capabilities derived 
from having abundant natural resources, high levels of technology, high standard of living and 
membership in exclusive international groups and organizations. The theorists of this concept 
argue that Canada can pursue its own policies in the international system with relatively little 
interference.16 
An alternative paradigm for Canadian foreign policy is the peripheral-
dependent/satellite approach, which according to Molot is based in the economic structuralist 
perspective.17 Representatives of this school, which emerged in the 1960s, are more 
heterogeneous in their viewpoints than middle and principal power proponents. This literature 
focuses on the economic structure, particularly in foreign direct investment in Canada, rather 
than political, military and diplomatic aspects. There are two streams within this group, one that 
sees Canada as a dependent state based on its export, foreign investment and technological 
                                                          
John J. Kirton, Canada as a principal power: a study in foreign policy and international relations (Toronto: Wiley, 
c1983)  
12 Neorealism’s leading proponent is Kenneth Waltz.  See Kenneth Waltz, Theory of International Politics   
(Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley 1979). 
13 James Eayrs, “Defining a new place for Canada in the Hierarchy of World Powers”, International Perspectives, 
(May-June 1975). 
 
14 David B. Dewitt, and John J. Kirton, Canada as a principal power: a study in foreign policy and international 
relations (Toronto: Wiley, c1983); John J. Kirton, “Canada as a G8 Principal Power”, in Readings in Canadian 
Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas  1st edition,,  eds. Duane Bratt  and Christopher J. Kukucha  (Don 
Mills: Oxford University Press, 2007) and John J. Kirton, “Canada as a G8 and G20 Principal Power,”  in Readings 
in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas (Second Edition), eds., Bratt Duane and Christopher J. 
Kukucha  (Don Mills:  Oxford University Press, 2011)  
15 Among the Canadian authors who support this idea appear the above mentioned David B. Dewitt and John J. 
Kirton, and Lasha Tchantouridzé, “The unipolar world: Theory, images, and Canada's foreign policy priorities,” 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18.1 (2012). Among the non-Canadian scholars, there is the well-known Paul 
Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of Great Powers, New York: Vintage Books, 1987, and Fareed Zakaria, The Post-
American World. New York: W.W. Norton, 2009. 
16 Duane Bratt and Christopher J. Kukucha,“Studying Canadian Foreign Policy: Varying Approaches” in Readings 
in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas (Second Edition), eds., Duane Bratt and Christopher J. 
Kukucha  (Don Mills: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4. 
17 Molot, “Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?”66. 
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structure, and other that considers Canada as an imperialist “secondary” power on its own that 
exports and utilizes capital in advancing its own economic and political interests abroad.18 
In addition to the above theories, in recent decades other non-traditional models have 
emerged with the intent of giving a more comprehensive explanation of Canadian foreign policy 
that combines both the domestic interests in Canada with its international pursuits. One of these 
is the dominant class theory put forward by Cranford Pratt.19 This approach offers a general 
theory of the determinants of Canadian policies toward the less developed countries and shows 
the limits imposed on Canadian foreign policy by the imperatives of the global capitalist system 
and the interests of the dominant class in Canada. 20 
However, among the diverse theoretical approaches intending to explain Canadian 
foreign policy, the most convincing in my opinion, is the one advanced by Mark Neufeld,21 who 
also borrows from Cranford Pratt and Robert Cox. Neufeld praises Pratt's dominant class theory 
approach, but at the same time sees its limitations.  He argues that it is “limited to being a theory 
of 'foreign policy', that leaves largely unanswered the question of how its emphasis on class 
society at the domestic level relates to the larger global context.”22 Furthermore, as a derivative 
                                                          
18 Molot, “Where do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?” 66-67.  Among the representatives of the dependency stream 
are  Harold Innis ,”Economic Trends in Canadian-American Relations” in Essays in Canadian Economic History , 
ed., Mary Q. Innis, (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1956);   Kari Levitt, Silent Surrender: The Multinational 
Corporation in Canada (Toronto: Macmillan, 1970),; Wallace Clemens , Continental Corporate Power (Toronto: 
McClellan and Stewart, 1977);  Daniel Drache, “The Crisis of Canadian Political Economy: Dependency Theory vs. 
the New Orthodoxy”, Canadian Journal of Political and Social Theory 7 (3) 1983;  and Michael  Claw, “Canadian 
Political Economy and the International Underdevelopment and Dependency Debate", Canadian Political Science 
Association papers, (Ottawa 1982) .  The major proponents of the imperialist perspective are Steve More and Debi 
Wells , Imperialism and the National Question in Canada (Toronto: Moore, 1975) and Jorge Niosi, Les 
multinationales canadiennes, (Toronto: Garamond  Press, 1985). More recent works in are Todd Gordon, 
Imperialist Canada (Winnipeg: Arbeiter Ring Pub., 2010); and Greg Albo, “Empire’s Ally: Canadian Foreign 
Policy,” The Bullet 37 (2006), http://www.socialistproject.ca/bullet/bullet037.html, accessed March 4, 2014, and 
also Greg Albo, "The “New Economy” and Capitalism Today," in Interrogating the New Economy: Restructuring 
Work in the 21st Century, ed. Norene Pupo and Mark P. Thomas (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 2010)  
19 Pratt, “Dominant Class ,” 99-135. 
 
20  Robert O. Matthews, “A Tribute to Cranford Pratt.” International Journal 57 (2002): 171. According to Greg 
Albo, who quotes several authors as Frank Park and Libby Park, John Porter, Wallace Clement and Denis Olsen, 
and particularly William Carroll, the composition of dominant class today in Canada is based on financial capital. 
“Canadian capital has reorganized and internationalized, with financial capital, particularly Canadian banks, at the 
centre of dominant industrial- financial groups (…)  this domestically owned form of ‘finance capital’ has come to 
dominate the Canadian ruling bloc and is the critical underpinning of the hegemony of neoliberal policies in 
Canada.” See Greg Albo, “Neoliberalism and Canada’s Ruling Class, “Monthly Review (2007), accessed March 3, 
2014, mrzine.monthlyreview.org/2007/albo070407.html.  
21 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 94-112. 
22 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 96. 
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of a structuralist theory, he argues that the dominant class approach overemphasizes the 
determining structures and neglects human agency.23 
Neufeldt proposes the use of the Gramscian concept of “hegemony” instead as it was 
developed by Robert Cox in his analysis of international relations to study Canadian foreign 
policy.24 The concept of hegemony assumes a world capitalist economy in which class relations 
is the main variable. According to Neufeld, hegemony “is understood to involve not dominance 
of one state by other, but rather the institution and maintenance of a world order that serves the 
interests of the dominant class of the dominant state while at the same time serves the interests 
of the dominant classes of other states as well.” 25  “[H]egemony is not limited to the level of 
international order…[It] has its parallel in the hegemony at the domestic level, where dominant 
classes make real concessions (always within limits) to subordinate classes to achieve broad 
societal consent for their leadership.”26 
Following this logic, Neufeld suggests that Canada became a “core state” of the system 
in the context of an “American led-hegemonic order.” It has enjoyed benefits in its association 
with American efforts toward liberalization in trade and investment regimes and concessions at 
the domestic level were made to “subaltern classes” (through the welfare system for example) 
to provide a “stable basis for capitalist class hegemony” in Canadian society.27 
Neufeld analyzes critically the “middle power” concept that is at the core of the liberal 
internationalist paradigm. He explains that the concept was presented as a model of Canada's 
behavior in the world that served the hegemony of the dominant class, both internally and 
abroad. It also created “an environment conducive to economic growth” and on it was based 
“the compromise of the liberal welfare state”, the “cornerstone of the hegemony”.28 The image 
of Canada as an internationally “responsible” country was crucial in creating an internal 
consensus to “support the extensive involvement in the maintenance of the global order.” 29   In 
this context, Canada played a “supportive” role of the hegemonic global order in two ways: the 
first was as “facilitator and mediator” that “helped to defuse potential conflicts” that could 
                                                          
23 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 96. 
24 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 49-66. 
25 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 97. 
26 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 98. 
27 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 99. 
28 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 99. 
29 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 99. 
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undermine the “stability of the global order”; the second was as a state “sacrificing” its national 
interests in order to show that the global order was not only “American” but that it also 
represented the “common interest.” 30  
The theoretical approach of Cox and Neufeld is an excellent starting point to explore 
some ideas about the current situation of the international capitalist system and the character of 
the relations between the hegemon and its allies. These considerations may help to clarify the 
position of Canada within the international system and the role it performs. 
For instance, in his most recent book Imperialist Canada, the Canadian scholar Todd 
Gordon criticizes those who think that Canada “does not have imperialist interests of its own”, 
and states that it “has a fairly global reach and does project power.”31 He also stresses that the 
capacity of countries of the North “to drain the wealth and resources from the South, suggests 
that imperialism is not the preserve of a single superpower.”32 Canada is classified as a “sub-
superpower” according to its “size and relative influence in the world” and has its “own 
independent capitalist interest” in exploiting the South. Gordon recognizes that Canada is 
integrated to some degree with US capital, but also pursues its interests bilaterally (trade and 
investment agreements) and through multilateral institutions.33  
Sub-superpowers have their own regional niche where they concentrate their 
influence.34 Gordon explains that sub-superpowers play a supportive role for the superpower 
when is necessary in multilateral organizations and in US-led military adventures. In this 
context, Canada offers a cover for US actions due to its better world image.35  This idea is 
similar to the one advanced by the Argentinean economist and theorist Claudio Katz who wrote:  
This domination is not exercised by a mysterious ’world power’ but through means of the 
military and diplomatic actions of each power in its main areas of influence. The role of 
the US is more prominent in ’Plan Colombia’ than in the Balkans conflict and the task of 
Europe is better defined in the Mediterranean crisis than in the development of the FTAA. 
This specificity relates to interests that each imperialist group channels in the geopolitical 
actions led by its states, something the theoreticians of Empire do not perceive.36 
                                                          
30 Neufeld, “Hegemony and Foreign Policy Analysis,” 99. 
31 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, 55. 
32 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, 55. 
33 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, 56 
34 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, 56.  
35 Gordon, Imperialist Canada, 57-58. 
36 Claudio Katz, “Imperialism in the 21st century,” International Viewpoint, 15 November (2002), , 
http://www.internationalviewpoint.org/spip.php?article329, accessed March 4, 2014 To this argument should be 
added that even though the US interests do not have  the same salience in all the areas, its presence is evident 
everywhere because it has the prerogatives of a superpower. 
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Some critics of Gordon’s views have pointed out that “Canada is both dependent and 
imperialist” and that NAFTA “has not only increased Canadian dependency on the American 
market but has sped up the rationalisation of the continental marketplace with the terms largely 
set south of the border.”37 Besides, “the role of Canada as a junior partner beside the US in the 
effort to control Haiti, Afghanistan, Iraq and the rest of the Middle East testify to growing 
dependence and integration.”38 It is also noted that Gordon does not provide a single example, 
in which Canada has independently projected its military and political power globally in a way 
independent of that of the United States.39 
Leo Panitch argues (referring to Europe, but that is applicable to other advanced 
capitalist countries) that capitalist powers pursue their own projects to obtain “more room for 
themselves economically, militarily and in the intelligence field” to increase their status within 
the American empire, but not to challenge it.40 In this regard, Katz suggests that today “rivalry, 
integration and hegemony” combine in a “more complex” way than in the past,41 while Albo 
states that in the context of internationalization of capital “the relations of cooperation and 
competitiveness between the advanced capitalist countries became redefined.”42 
According to Katz globalization implies more levels of “association between 
internationalized capital”, but “there is no indication of a complete globalization of the ruling 
class.”43 In other words, there are not “supranational state agencies matching the 
transnationalisation of the capitalist market.”44 Thus, the ruling classes “act through distinct 
governments, institutions and states, defending … their specific interests.”45  
However, Robert Cox, using a Gramscian interpretation, posits that while “great powers 
have relative freedom to determine their foreign policies in response to domestic interests, 
                                                          
37 Henry Heller, “Imperialist Canada,” review of Imperialist Canada, by Todd Gordon, Historical Materialism 20.2 
(2012): 229. 
38 Heller, “Imperialist Canada,” 229. 
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40 Peter Gowan, Leo Panitch and Martin Shaw,  “The State, Globalisation and the New Imperialism: A Roundtable 
Discussion,”  Historical Materialism, 9 (2001), 17. 
41 Katz, “Imperialism in the 21st century,” 
42 Albo, “Empire's Ally,” 2. 
43 Katz, “Imperialism in the 21st century,” 
44 Gowan, Panitch and Shaw,  “The State, Globalisation and the New Imperialism,” 11. 
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smaller powers have less autonomy.”46  This idea serves to illustrate the asymmetric 
relationship between the US (the dominant power within the hegemonic system) and Canada (a 
subaltern core country).  This argument also refutes the thesis of the “independent” nature of 
Canada as an imperialist power, as Albo and Gordon posit. In the context of a world hegemony 
the dominant class of a subaltern power may enjoy some relative autonomy but not complete 
independence because it is part of “a complex of international social relations which connect 
the social classes of the different countries.”47 And, of course, those relations functions 
“according to a hierarchy of powers within the inter-state structure of hegemony”, the leading 
state consults first and seeks the support of second-rank core states.48  As Cox noted: “The 
economic life of subordinate nations is penetrated by and intertwined with that of powerful 
nations”.49 This idea reflects the dialectic link between interdependence and subordination 
existing between the dominant center and its allies. This abstraction is translated in a very 
graphic way in the particular context of US-Canada relations by Panitch who observes that: 
Canadians who work in the Canadian Defense Department – and I would add in the 
Canadian Finance Department – who walk the streets of Ottawa but have a degree of 
influence on American foreign policy and economic policy, are semi-citizens of the 
American empire. It’s a type of empire which has penetrated other sovereign nation-
states, and which, in turn, does indeed include them in decision making – albeit not as 
equals.50  
 
           In sum, although the middle power approach is still the predominant prism 
through which many interpret Canadian foreign policy, alternative approaches offer more 
nuanced and deeper insights into Canada’s overseas behavior. Some of these alternative 
approaches were explored in the preceding pages.   
It is argued here that the framework that best explains today's Canada foreign policy and 
consequently the evolution of the policy towards Cuba is the one proposed by Neufeld. The 
virtue of this approach is that it reflects the substance of the Canadian foreign policy beyond 
                                                          
46  Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 59. 
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49 Cox, “Gramsci, Hegemony and International Relations,” 59. 
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the debatable validity of traditional myths or models. The essence of it is that Canadian 
dominant class is well entrenched in a hegemonic international capitalist system, from which it 
obtains benefits. Therefore, there is common shared interest in the maintenance of that system, 
which prevails over any other differences between members of that class. In this context, the 
role of human agency should not be overlooked. Even though, the hegemonic system sets the 
role and the limits of a capitalist country within it according to its relative power, there is some 
space for human agency. As this case study shows, the actions, ideology and political 
preferences of relevant politicians, in particular of prime ministers or foreign ministers, can 
influence the course of Canadian foreign policy within the boundaries of the hegemonic system, 
especially if the strategic and economic imperatives of the hegemon are not trespassed. 
It is within these limits determined by the hegemon (i.e., the US) that Canada’s 
“constructive engagement” with Cuba can be understood. That is, Canada’ approach to 
“engaging” with Havana, in the wake of the US blockade, did not threaten US hegemony or its 
economic or strategic interests. However, this engagement allowed Ottawa some semblance of 
foreign policy independence and responded to the demands of Canada’s dominant class 
interests. 
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CHAPTER 3: 
CANADIAN FOREIGN POLICY DURING THE HARPER GOVERNMENT 
 
Since the Conservative administration of Stephen Harper took office in 2006, Canada’s 
foreign policy strategies have received growing criticisms from amongst academics and other 
observers. They have suggested that while Ottawa reiterates that the defining values driving 
Canada’s overseas actions are rooted in respect for “freedom, democracy, human rights and the 
rule of law,” Harper’s actions actually represent a repudiation of these values which have been 
pursued by previous governments.51The goal of this chapter is to analyze the main aspects in 
the evolution of Canadian foreign policy under Harper’s regime.  To do this, the chapter is 
divided into two parts.  
The first part deals with some domestic aspects that influence Canada's foreign policy. 
The analysis will focus on institutional elements that are combined with the particular agency 
of the prime minister and his party (i.e., ideology, world vision and political preferences), to 
explain the shift that happened from 2006 to the present. The section will also show the 
weakening of civil society organizations that used to have more participation in Canadian 
foreign policy in previous decades. The second part will discuss the strategic relationship 
between Canada and the US under the Harper Administration particularly through the security 
and economic axes, and the motivations behind the search for a closer alliance with 
Washington.  This section also focuses on the prominence that trade and economic issues have 
reached in the design of Ottawa's current foreign policy in order to demonstrate why the Harper 
administration no longer views Cuba an in important element in Canada’s foreign policy design. 
3.1 Domestic Factors Influencing Canadian Foreign Policy 
   3.1.1 Institutional Aspects, Ideological Trends, and Agency 
Canadian foreign policy is determined by a combination of institutional arrangements, 
ideological orientation, human agency and the interaction of these with various domestic actors. 
In this context, a primary role is accorded to the Prime Minister, as the head of government. 
According to Gecelovsky, the powers of the Canadian Prime Minister in conducting foreign 
policy are such that “may override the interests” of other actors and allow that person to “pursue 
                                                          
51 John Kirton, “Vulnerable America, capable Canada: Convergent leadership for an interconnected world,” 
Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18.1 (2012): 137. 
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the foreign policy of his/her liking.”52 Even though there are some constraints to the executive 
competencies of the prime minister, including the preferences, of other state and social actors, 
“the constraints are only constraints if the prime minister allows them to stop him/her from 
acting.”53 The Prime Minister “establishes the parameters within which the foreign minister 
operates” and is “able to change the content and direction of Canada’s policy at his/her 
discretion without consultation”.54 
In the last decades, there was a trend towards the centralization of Canadian foreign 
policy under the Prime Minister’s Office (PMO).55 This move started with Trudeau and was 
continued by successive prime ministers. Under the Conservative government this tendency has 
accelerated. Harper’s administration “has sought to control fully within the PMO not only 
decision-making but also communicating the results of those decisions to the Canadian public” 
in what has been called “Harper’s government ‘obsessive control of information.’ ”56 Some 
authors have noted that the prime minister does not like to consult many advisors and delegates 
little to other members of his cabinet.57 
According to some analysts, the current Canadian prime minister, has a Manichaean 
view of the world where there is only “good and bad, right and wrong.”58 At the international 
level, this is reflected in the fact that Harper privileges bilateral relations with “key” countries 
like the US and “those multilateral forums where [Canada] can make economic gains” (i.e. 
Trans-Pacific Partnership, the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement and the Pacific 
Alliance). Conversely, he is doubtful about the usefulness of the UN, the Commonwealth and 
Francophonie, which are deemed as “multilateral talking-shop forums.”59  
Ideologically, the Conservative Party, which Stephen Harper leads, shares many 
ideological similarities with the Republican Party in the US, 60 and on the international stage, 
                                                          
52 Paul Gecelovsky, “Of Legacies and Lightning Bolts Revisited: Another Look at the Prime Minister and Canadian 
Foreign Policy,” in Readings in Canadian Foreign Policy: Classic Debates and New Ideas, ed. Duane Bratt and 
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57 Michael D. Behiels, “Stephen Harper's Rise to Power: Will His ‘New’ Conservative Party Become Canada's 
‘Natural Governing Party’ of the Twenty-First Century?” American Review of Canadian Studies 40.1 (2010): 133. 
58 Colin Robertson, “Stephen Harper’s World View,” iPolitics,  December 15, 2013, accessed March 8, 2014,  
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tends to echo and reflect many of the latter’s preferences. Harper’s Conservatives, like the  
Republicans in the US,  are strong advocates of  “economic conservatism”, that is, of  “less 
government intervention in the economy — lower taxes, less regulation — and a more 
restrictive interpretation on the application of federal powers than previous governments.”61 In 
other words, their policy preferences reflect a very clear neoliberal approach that tends to 
undermine the traditional Canadian welfare system to benefit the entrepreneurial elite. The 
Conservative Party is focused on the advancement and defense – domestically and abroad - of 
the economic interests of the dominant class, especially those of western Canada and 
particularly those of the oil and gas producers in Alberta.62 
Given the ample room for maneuvering that a Canadian Prime Minister has in steering 
the country’s foreign policy, it can be said that Canada’s current international stance owes a lot 
to Harper’s ideological and personal preferences. Indeed, this policy direction is only limited 
by the restrictions that are imposed by the dynamics of the international capitalist system and 
by Canada’s objective limitations as a country.  This flexibility is permitted to the extent that 
Canadian foreign policy responds to and reflects the main international interests of Canada’s 
dominant classes.  Indeed, one of the central concerns of Canada’s economic elite is the 
deepening of its strategic links with the US, which will be analyzed later in this chapter. 
    3.1.2 Harper’s Foreign Policy and the Weakening of Civil Society 
The relative easiness with which Harper’s Conservative course in Canadian foreign 
policy has been implemented in recent years is also related to the current internal balance 
between right-leaning and progressive forces within the Canadian society. This process is 
closely linked to the application of neoliberal policies during the last two decades, which have 
weakened the labour organizations and social movements to a considerable extent.63  Neoliberal 
trends are more powerful today than in the past and are better organized. As Albo states 
“neoliberalism [has been] consolidated as the matrix of governmental policy, whatever the 
political party in power and level of government.”64 Within this framework,  the so-called 
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“counter-consensus,” as Cranford Pratt labelled those progressive groups of the earlier decades 
that fought for a more progressive Canadian foreign policy stance,65 have been significantly  
diluted and some of their leaders and organizations co-opted.66 Further, progressive social 
movements have become very “diverse” and have “few core points of convergence,”67 and this 
has also served to weaken them as a coherent force. 
In pursuit of its neoliberal agenda, the Conservatives under Stephen Harper, have chosen 
a “confrontational relationship with much of the NGO community” that had previously enjoyed 
a tradition of some participation and influence in some aspects of Canadian foreign policy.68 
The current government has targeted many manifestations of “critical thinking”, silencing 
“voices of dissent, defunding advocacy groups, and undermining the ability of independent 
organizations to confront the policies of Harper.”69 Amongst the progressive organizations that 
have been defunded by the government are the International Centre for Human Rights and 
Democracy, KAIROS (a collection of churches and religious organizations) and the Canadian 
Council for International Cooperation that represents over 100 NGOs concerned with 
development assistance.70 To further weaken the progressive sector, the government through 
the Canadian Revenue Agency (CRA) now targets many of them, such as progressive think 
tanks, environmental groups, and international aid and social justice organizations, for financial 
audits.71 All this constitutes a further example of the fading of progressive alternatives within 
civil society.  In addition, the demise of the Canadian International Development Agency 
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(CIDA) through its merger within the former Department of Foreign Affairs and International 
Trade (DFAIT), and the subordination of its aid purposes to the promotion of Canadian business 
interests (specifically its mining interests) abroad can be seen as another chapter of that trend.  
Under these circumstances, the social resistance to the conservative course in Canadian foreign 
policy is considerably minimized.  
3.2 The Primacy of Canadian-US Relations 
The relationship with the US has always been an overwhelming fact in Canadian foreign 
policy. These relations are defined by a growing integration and interdependence72 and 
unquestionable asymmetry. In recent years, the main trends in Canadian-US links have been 
mainly shaped by the consequences of the terrorist attacks of 9/11 in 2001 and the persistence 
of the capitalist crisis that started in 2008. While Canada-US relations are multidimensional, 
for the purposes of this research they will be analyzed only with reference to the security and 
economic aspects.  
    3.2.1 The Security Dimension 
          With respect to the issue of security, the Harper government came to power in 2006 with 
an electoral platform advocating a “more robust military to bolster Canada's international 
presence”, and this was very much in line with the policies of the Bush administration.73 Once 
in office, Harper adopted measures that continued the “strategy of aligning with Washington 
on international security.”74 Amongst his actions were the decisions to spend 1.4 billion to 
improve national security, the renewal of North American Aerospace Defense Command 
(NORAD) agreement indefinitely, and boosting military spending in $17 billion.75 
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Consequently, the Canadian stance within NATO became more assertive and belligerent as a 
result of the evolution of this military agenda.76  
One of the more distinctive militaristic aspects of Canada's foreign policy under the 
Harper government has been the efforts and resources devoted to the Canadian military mission 
in Afghanistan. One of the priorities of the Conservative government was to extend and expand 
“Canada's mandate in Afghanistan”, first until 2009 and later until 2011.77 The real motivations 
behind this move, according to Bratt were “supporting the Canada-US relationship” and 
“rebuilding the Canadian military.”78  The Afghanistan decision was seen as a deliberate move 
to compensate the US for the refusal of the Chrétien and Martin governments to follow 
Washington in the Iraq mission and in the effort to advance the Ballistic Missile Defense 
initiative.79  
In addition, this participation “in an inherited war that Harper made his own” reflected 
the wishes of the new prime minister to identify “Canada as a global leader in the military 
realm”.80 It follows the “premise that Canada might be more than a mere middle power, even 
in the classically hard military realm.”81 Although the deepening cooperation with the US 
started in the second half of the Chrétien administration conditioned by the global constraints 
and security needs that were imposed by the capitalist hegemonic system after the 9/11, under 
the Conservatives this collaboration was raised to a higher level. As Albo observes: “The Harper 
government inherited the Afghanistan mission but they have defined it as a centre-piece of their 
government, partly on its own terms and partly in embracing the American geo-political 
vision.”82 In general, Albo continues, the Harper government pushed more vigorously than 
Chrétien and Martin governments in the direction of “more closely defining Canadian foreign 
policy interests as tied to U.S. security concerns and imperial agendas to ensure Canadian 
capitalists access to U.S. markets for their goods and capital.”83   
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    3.2.2 The Economic Dimension 
Under Harper, Canada-US economic ties became even more intertwined. One of the 
most significant aspects of their relationship involves the issue of energy. In 2006, Harper 
advanced the concept of Canada as a superpower, which was based on the country’s strengths 
in energy production amongst other resources.  His goal was to present Canada as indispensable 
to the US in terms of the latter’s energy needs to fill in the vulnerabilities of the US in this area 
and respond to the American priority of ensuring energy security.84 At the same time, this also 
serves Canadian economic interests, especially those of the energy sector, which was seeking 
to ensure maintain and increase access to US markets. 
The extraordinary importance of Canadian-US energy relations during the last decade, 
and particularly during Harper's administration is the result of the Canadian government’s 
growing dependence on its revenues from energy and other resources, and this has “contributed 
to the substantial realignment of federal interests with those of major energy-producing 
provinces.”85 For this reason during the past decade “[m]aintaining US market access for a wide 
array of Canadian energy sources has been a central priority for Canadian Embassy officials in 
Washington.”86  
In the few last years, the energy issues in Canadian-US relations have become very 
interlinked with environmental concerns as activists groups have gained momentum in their 
lobbying to protect the environment from harms inflicted by extractive industry development.  
This explains why the Harper government has aligned its position with that of the White House 
on both energy and environmental issues.87This effort became necessary because major 
environmental groups in the US have increasingly attacked the Canadian oils sands imports 
since 2006 for their high impact on greenhouse gas emissions.88 The main concern of the 
Canadian government has been “to protect US market access for Canadian oil sands and other 
energy production while working closely with American negotiators in broader global climate 
negotiations,”89 as explained below.  
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The arrival of Obama to the White House added new challenges to the Canadian-US 
energy relations. The importance given by Obama to the environmental concerns and his 
government’s proposal to cut greenhouse emissions “to 80 percent below the 1990 level by 
2050”, contrasted with “Canada's modest objective of lowering emissions by 50 percent from 
the 2006 level by 2050.”90 Also, “Obama's pledge to end US reliance on dirty (energy)” 
provoked the alarm of Canadian oil producers and consequently of the Conservative 
government that “had viewed Canada's role as the largest supplier of energy to the US as an 
important bargaining chip in any reassessment of NAFTA.”91  
Despite its lack of enthusiasm for the Obama’s initiatives on climate change,92 the 
Conservative government acted quickly “to make common cause with Washington in a 
collective effort to enhance North American energy and environmental security.”93 In the last 
few years, Harper's government has tried to appease Obama's administration by proposing a 
bilateral climate change agreement to neutralize American concerns about energy security, 
while protecting Canadian oil exporters’ interests.94 However, the prolonged US delay in 
authorizing the Keystone XL pipeline95 to cross the Canada-USA border in response to the 
pressures of environmental groups, was considered as a fact “without precedent” in the bilateral 
relations.96 The US Congress approved the Keystone XL finally in February 2015, but President 
Obama vetoed it soon afterward.97 Conservatives are no doubt hoping that the next American 
federal elections will bring changes that will better align with their preferences. 
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The delay of this project for so many years "reinforced Ottawa’s commitment to 
diversify Canada's energy exports outside North America.”98 However, some authors notice 
that “Canada’s record for diversifying its trade from the US” has been “modest” over the last 
years.99 At the end, “all governments made a rhetorical commitment to diversify Canada's 
foreign trade away from the American market” but “each prime minister has left the country 
more dependent on the US market than when he took office.”100 As Kirton explains, “the 
Canada–United States relationship defines Canadian foreign policy.”   
 For some authors “Canadian foreign policy demonstrated more divergence from 
Washington’s policies under the Liberals” when “the United States’ position in the international 
system appeared to be both unparalleled and unchallenged”, while under the Conservatives “it 
became less dissenting” from Washington when the US seemed to be in decline.101   This difference 
has been explained as due mainly by one factor: the emergence and increasing relevance of non-
Western powers. Even though the US continues to be a “dominant military power” there is an 
emergence of other countries “reflecting a transformation in the distribution of economic power 
from the United States to emerging countries like Brazil, Russia, India, China (the BRICs), and 
others.”102  The debacle of the World Trade Center led to a feeling of shared vulnerability among 
developed capitalist countries and the instinctive need to close ranks with the hegemon and the 
leading security guarantor. The emergence and growing salience of BRICS and the clear economic 
weaknesses of the main imperial center, instead of provoking defection among capitalist countries, 
have spurred a deeper subordination to Washington because what is at stake is the survival of the 
long established Western dominance over the international economics and politics. However, this 
does not preclude advanced capitalist countries, including Canada, from pursuing economic gains 
even with those rival “newcomers” as long as strategic hegemonic goals are not at stake. Like 
“constructive engagement” with Cuba, Canada is able to pursue foreign policy initiatives with the 
BRICS as long as these do not threaten the interests of the hegemon.  In this context, as Hawes 
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101 Lasha Tchantouridzé, “The unipolar world: Theory, images, and Canada's foreign policy priorities,” Canadian 
Foreign Policy Journal 18.1 (2012): 36. 
102 Jeffrey Ayres and Laura Macdonald, "A community of fate? Non-polarity and North American security 
interdependence," Canadian Foreign Policy Journal 18 (2012): 92. 
22 
 
and Kirkey explain, “systemic change [for example the rise of the BRICS] will, or should, have 
the curious effect of reinforcing the Canadian- American partnership.”103 
  Canada’s growing ties with the BRICS highlights another important aspect of the change 
in Canadian foreign policy under Harper. According to the observers, while the Harper government 
initially seemed to have placed some emphasis on the principles of democracy, human rights, rule 
of law, etc., in its international dealings, it seemed to be paying less attention to these and turning 
increasingly towards a more open “economic diplomacy”. 104  One clear example is the evolution 
of the policy towards China. During the first four years of his administration, Harper was very 
critical of Beijing on human rights and democracy issues and he did not pay any official visit to 
the Asian country. However, “Mr. Harper reversed course in his China policy, under pressure from 
Canadian businesses who claimed the Conservative government’s principles were costing them 
contracts.”105 In February 2012, Harper visited China finally and pushed for “stronger relations” 
with Beijing in his speeches and “buried the human rights agenda.”106 
The objective of the current Canadian approach is “to focus Canada's international efforts 
primarily on one goal: forging new trade deals and business opportunities in the rapidly expanding 
markets of Asia and South America.”107 In other words, the objective was to take advantage of the 
opportunities in the emergent economies. A confidential government document obtained by CBC 
News in 2012 revealed the government’s willingness to subordinate human rights and democracy 
promotion in order to promote economic gains. It noted that, “[t]o succeed we will need to pursue 
political relationships in tandem with economic interests even where political interests or values 
may not align.”108 
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Related to this, “Canada is increasingly using foreign aid to further its trade interests.”109 
The goal of promoting development for the poor is now explicitly linked to economic gains, a 
stance which diverges from Canada’s early advocacy of promoting human security—as was done 
under the Chretien administration and which was promoted by his Foreign Minister Lloyd 
Axworthy.110 The majority of the countries proposed as recipients of foreign aid are now chosen 
in part “because of the commercial benefits they can offer to Canada”, particularly in the extractive 
sector.111 The aforementioned merger of CIDA with the DFAIT follows this logic of putting the 
promotion of trade and economic interests first.  
However, while the government may be putting economics ahead of principles, its rhetoric 
still incorporates the latter. As one analyst cleverly notes, the recurrence of the “human-rights 
rhetoric” in the Conservatives' foreign policy appears in those cases “where there are votes to be 
won at home and only a tiny amount of trade at risk.”112 The  policy towards Cuba of successive 
governments that will be analyzed in the fourth chapter is evidence of this approach. 
3.3 Concluding Observations  
Canadian prime ministers possess ample prerogatives to influence foreign policy 
directions with little constraints. Their personal preferences, style, and ideological orientation 
along with that of their parties, are factors that must be taken into account in explaining the 
design of Canadian foreign policy.  Under Harper, the neoliberal tenets of his preferred 
economic approach, his Manichean view of the world, and the need to appeal to some specific 
constituencies of his party, have resulted in a departure from Canada’s traditional international 
policy of his predecessors.   Notwithstanding the influence that the personal and ideological 
view of a Prime Minister have in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy, the implementation 
of those ideas are possible because they reflect in substance also the prevailing interests of the 
Canadian dominant economic class, of which Harper and his party are loyal representatives.  
In this scenario the relations with the hegemonic southern neighbor (i.e., the US) 
occupies a privileged position. Under Harper, Canada has attempted to improve the overall 
relations with the US through a closer cooperation in the political and defense contexts, and at 
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the global level has tried to avoid frictions around conflicting issues that could adversely affect 
the relationship. The primary goal of this approach is to secure the access of Canadian 
companies to the US market, particularly in the strategic energy sector and offset the impact of 
border issues on economic and physical flows between both countries. It is within this 
framework that Canada’s relations with Cuba under the Conservatives must be interpreted. 
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CHAPTER 4: 
CANADIAN-CUBAN RELATIONS: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE 
This chapter provides a historical overview of Canadian-Cuban relations adopted by 
several Canadian government’s from the 1960s until the mid-2000s.  This chapter will show 
the main aspects of the evolution of bilateral relations in the last five decades until the period 
before the election of Harper’s Conservative government. In this overview of the historical 
relationship, only those moments deemed the most relevant to the Canadian-Cuban relationship 
will be analyzed and contrasted with the always-inescapable US positions. This process will 
allow for a better comparison in the following chapter of the extent to which the Harper 
government has distanced itself from the behaviors of all previous Canadian governments. Due 
to space issues, the research will focus on the most relevant governments: Diefenbaker, Trudeau 
and Chrétien as they were deemed to have had the closest ties with Cuba and provide the 
strongest evidence of engagement approach, subsequently labelled “constructive engagement” 
under Chrétien. Yet, as the discussion below reveals, their association with the island never 
jeopardized Canada’s relations with the US, nor undermined its hegemonic status.  
The chapter is organized into two sections. The first is a historical assessment of the Cuban 
policies of the administrations mentioned above. The second is an overview of scholarly debates 
about the virtues and limitations of the policy of “constructive engagement”.  
4.1 Historical Overview of Canada-Cuba Relations 
4.1.1 Diefenbaker Period 
The government of the Conservative Prime Minister John Diefenbaker is one of the 
most interesting periods in the Canadian-Cuban relations. His government was compelled to 
deal with the consequences of the Cuban revolution and the deterioration of Havana’s links 
with the US. In some ways,  the patterns adopted by that government marked the Canadian-
Cuba relationship for the following decades. 
Shortly after the triumph of the Cuban Revolution in 1959, the US-Cuban relations 
became tense due to the implementation of the agrarian reform and other nationalization 
measures that affected important American business interests on the island. Washington started 
to adopt punitive tactics against Havana that would eventually lead to an economic embargo 
and the termination of diplomatic relations. Simultaneously, the White House pressured the rest 
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of the countries in the Americas to follow a similar path, only Mexico and Canada did not abide 
by such demands. 
Prime Minister Diefenbaker resisted US pressure to break relations with Cuba and refused 
to follow US economic embargo.113 One reason which scholars have  given is that he was keen 
to fill the commercial vacuum after the termination of the US trade links.114 Despite this 
difference with the US, it must be noted that the PM did not undertake any actions that 
undermined or threaten US interests in any way. In the design of its Cuban policy, the 
Diefenbaker Government tried to follow a very balanced line between the position to continue 
diplomatic and economic relations with Cuba, and the attempt to satisfy some of the primary 
US concerns. The guidelines of the Canadian stance were established in two statements of the 
prime minister in December 1960. In Parliament, Diefenbaker expressed very clearly that 
“Canada reserves the right to trade with any country, including Cuba, and any commodity it so 
pleases.”115 Some days later, he refined this position when he declared that Canada would 
restrict the export of equipment or material “of clearly strategic nature” (arms, ammunition, 
military and related equipment, aircraft engines) to Cuba, while there would be “no limitations” 
on general trade with Cuba.116 
Despite all these statements and the endurance of the myth of Diefenbaker as the 
nationalist prime minister that faced Washington to maintain Canada’s stance,117 the facts 
demonstrate that Canada-US strategic alliance was never at stake. The solidness of the North 
American partnership was proven during the Missile Crisis of October 1962. The prevalent 
view of those critical moments shows a Diefenbaker who was reluctant and hesitant “about how 
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to deal with the situation, and to what extent Canada had to be involved” after receiving 
demands from President Kennedy that he support the American position.118 However, despite 
his concerns, more detailed historical evidence reveals, that in practice, Canada acted as faithful 
supporter of the US during the crisis as the Canadian Defence Minister, Douglas Harkness, had 
readied Canada’s air force as well as its navy to go into action on behalf of the Americans.119 
This fact demonstrated clearly that although the personal preferences and ideas of a prime 
minister could influence the foreign policy in diverse paths, that room for manoeuver is 
constrained by the demands and the prevailing hierarchy within the international system. 
“Although Canada was thus the only US ally to take on an active military role during the 
October crisis, the Prime Minister’s prevarications and the resulting confrontation between 
Canada and the United States are the main focus of the studies of Canadian reactions to the 
standoff between the superpowers.”120Another relevant element of the Canadian allegiance to 
the US and the Western Alliance in the Cuban case is the cooperation over intelligence that 
Ottawa provided to Washington and other allies from the Canadian embassy in Havana since 
the beginning of the Cuban Revolution. This cooperation was particularly important during the 
October Crisis and afterward121 and only became known recently. 
Nonetheless, despite the strategic alliance and ideological empathy between Canada and 
the US, the Canadian government under Diefenbaker resisted the Washington pressures to end 
the diplomatic and economic links with Cuba. Canadian perceptions about Cuba were different 
from those of the US and the Ottawa’s stance was helped somewhat by its non-membership of 
the Organization of American States (OAS), which was dominated by the US.122 The patterns 
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established by the Diefenbaker government to a great extent set the essential course of Canada’s 
Cuba policy during the futures decades123 and set the scene for what became known in the 1990s 
as “constructive engagement”. 
4.1.2 Trudeau Period 
In the academic literature about Canada-Cuba relations the predominant view is that the 
years of the Liberal government of Pierre Trudeau (1968-1984) represent the “apex of bilateral 
relations.”124 The perceptions about those moments has been influenced by a very well known 
book written by Robert Wright125 that contains detailed information about the antecedents, the 
developments and the aftermath of the Trudeau’s highly publicized visit to Cuba in 1976. This 
controversial visit to the island, which was the first one by a Western head of government, was 
the “highwater mark of Trudeau’s Cuba policy”126 and the “acceptance of the Cuban 
revolutionary government” became “a litmus test of an independent foreign policy for Canadian 
governments.”127 
This event was part of the revision of Canadian foreign policy by Trudeau to reverse the 
“drift towards US dominance.”128 The Prime Minister’s  so-called Third Option strategy  “that 
called for the diversification of trade as the key for national independence gave Latin America 
an important place in the Canadian government’s strategic economic thinking.”129  
During the famous visit important documents of cooperation were signed between both 
countries in different areas. Cuba was included as a recipient of Canadian development 
assistance programs. The crucial instants of that historic visit were when Trudeau at the end of 
a speech at the city of Cienfuegos exclaimed: “Viva el pueblo cubano!  Viva el primer ministro 
Fidel Castro!  Viva la amistad cubano-canadiense !”130 
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A cooling in Canada-Cuban relations, however, was witnessed a few years later over  
differences regarding  Cuba’s role  in the Angola war.131 Even the Canadian International 
Development Agency (CIDA) aid to Cuba was terminated in 1978. 132 Nonetheless, the personal 
relationship between Castro and Trudeau, which “was cast as two equals sleeping with the 
elephant,”133 remained solid over the years and Castro was one of the pallbearers at the 
Trudeau’s funeral in 2000.  
However,  there are some authors who  have a different perspective of Canada’s Cuba 
policy under Trudeau. According to Greg Donaghy and Mary Halloran “despite the unique 
personal bond that joined Castro and Trudeau, Canada’s relations with Cuba were never very 
special.”134 The prime minister’s advisers in the Department of External Affairs managed the 
rapprochement with Havana carefully since the beginning. 135 Following that logic, Trudeau’s 
visit was a “calculated effort” to maintain a “balanced approach” between the Canadian-Cuban 
relations and the evolution of US-Cuba links, which was regarded as “an effort that became 
increasingly unmanageable following Cuba’s intervention in Africa in 1975.”136 This fact was 
portrayed as another chapter in the East-West competition between the US and the Soviet Union 
for influence in the Third World and the respective allies were constrained to reaffirm their 
allegiances to the corresponding hegemon. Canada as a part of the Western alliance endorsed 
the American view and of course was in the opposite side to Cuba in this issue.137 This outcome 
showed once again that loyalties, derived from the membership to a given system of alliances, 
prevailed over any personal sympathy or dislike of a prime minister. 
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Despite the challenges that existed during the period, in the literature on Canadian-
Cuban links, the Trudeau era continues to rank high as a symbolic moment in the development 
of the two nations’ bilateral relations. 
4.1.3 Chrétien Period 
The Liberal government of  Prime Minister Jean Chrétien (1993-2003) represented a 
leap forward in the Canada-Cuba relations and probably the most productive stage in the 
bilateral relations.  Under this administration the policy of “constructive engagement”  was 
offically formulated. Lana Wylie characterized “constructive engagement” as  entailing a link 
between cooperation and  influence:  
While engagement implies regular relations (trade, investment, diplomatic exchanges), 
“constructive engagement” hopes to engage in these ways in order to achieve change 
within Cuba’s domestic sphere. The goal of constructive engagement is to use the access 
that comes from regular relations to influence the development of a western style 
economic and political model on the island ... constructive engagement aspires to do this 
through fostering connections with Cubans and quietly encouraging the hoped-for 
changes.138 
 
Chrétien promoted this policy based  on the belief “that engaging the Cubans was the 
best way to secure meaningful and enduring political reforms” in the country.139  Expanding 
further on this  policy was the  Secretary of State Christine Stewart.  She explained  in 1994 in 
Havana what the  objectives of the Canadian government were  with respect to engagement:   
“First, we are here to promote several concrete Canadian interests, especially in terms of 
commercial activities. Second, we wish to support positive peaceful change in Cuba, both 
political and economic.”140  She added that Canada wanted  “to encourage Cuba’s full 
constructive participation in international affairs.”141  Axworthy elaborated further on the 
policy: “Our engagement is designed to provide Cuba with the assistance and support that will 
be needed if a peaceful transition is to occur with full respect for human rights, genuinely 
representative government institutions and an open economy.” 142 
The economic factor was an important variable in the Chrétien government’s approach to 
Cuba in the 1990s.   According to James Bartleman, former Canadian ambassador to Cuba, the 
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Liberal government “hoped that closer ties would prepare the ground for Canadian companies to 
take advantage of the trade and investment opportunities certain to follow when Cuba eventually 
adopted a market economy.”143  It has been suggested   that trade and investment opportunities in 
Cuba have been “important policy drivers for Canadian policy makers” and "the business 
community in Canada has been a strong advocate of dialogue and exchange with the Cuban 
government and people" because  it recognizes "that closer political relations hold the key to 
opening up Cuba’s commercial doors."144  
Canadian companies with interests on the island, specifically the tourism industry and the 
giant nickel mining and processing company Sherritt International, were major advocates of closer 
ties between the two countries. 
Facilitating Canada’s economic interests on the island was the fact that after the end of the 
Cold War, Cuba lost its major economic supporter with the collapse of the Soviet Union.  As such, 
Cuba’s economic relations with Canada became of greater significance to the island’s economic 
health and this paved the way for closer ties between the Chretien administration and the 
government in Havana.  Additionally, the identity factor was also important.  Chrétien “sought to 
cultivate warmer relations with Havana” in order to “differentiate himself from Mulroney’s cosy 
relationship with Washington.”145   For authors such as Lana Wylie, the most important perception 
in Canada of bilateral relations with the island is shaped by the “Canadian self-image as a good 
international citizen, as a peacekeeper, and as distinct from the US.” 146 
Further, he wanted to “revitalize what was once a politically popular bilateral relationship 
under his colleague and former Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau”. In this way, “the Canadian-Cuban 
relationship took on added significance during the Chrétien years for symbolic, personal, 
commercial and electoral reasons.”147 
Chrétien’s policy towards Cuba can be seen in two stages, one from 1994 to 1998 and the 
second from 1998 to 2003. The first period was “especially productive” in the relationship 
particularly “under the tutelage of foreign affairs minister Lloyd Axworthy.”148 Canada supported 
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the proposal to readmit Cuba to the Organization of American States (OAS), and “reopened a 
modest development assistance program under the Canadian International Development Agency 
(CIDA), encouraged connections with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and universities, 
and promoted business ties.”149 In ten years, the bilateral trade grew from $250 million in 1994 to 
almost $1 billion in 2003-04. 150 Canada ranked among the most important foreign investors of the 
island, became a key source of tourists, and signed a 14-Point Joint Declaration with the Cuban 
government in 1997.151 At the diplomatic level “the Chrétien government consistently opposed the 
US economic embargo” (while it also criticized Cuba’s human rights record) and denounced the 
Helms-Burton law.”152 The particular approach implemented by the Chrétien government towards 
Cuba started to be known in policy circles as “constructive engagement”, or principled 
pragmatism.153  
Undoubtedly, the biggest achievement of Canada’s Cuba policy in this period was the 
announcement of the signing of the Joint Declaration in 1997. Both governments accepted the 
document that had been negotiated for months during a visit of the Canadian Foreign Minister, 
Lloyd Axworthy, to Havana. This agreement committed the two countries to  a “collaboration in 
six key areas of political reform in Cuba, including exchanges of judges and parliamentarians, 
cooperation on strengthening a Cuban citizens’ complaints commission, discussion of human 
rights, and support for the work of Canadian and Cuban non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs).”154 There were also agreements to cooperate in the fields of economic policy, banking, 
foreign investment, narcotics interdiction, the prevention of international terrorism, health matters, 
and various cultural, athletic, and academic undertakings.155  
However, the Chrétien Government’s Cuba policy started to decline in the wake of the 
1998 visit of the Canadian prime minister to Havana. During his visit, Chrétien tried “to lecture 
Fidel Castro about human rights and democratic freedoms” and asked for the release of some 
Cuban dissidents.156 The lack of a positive response from the Cubans led to a worsening of bilateral 
relations. In response to Castro’s non-compliance, “Canada strengthened its criticism of Cuba, 
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reduced development assistance, discouraged Canadian investment in Cuba, and supported several 
anti-Cuban U.S. initiatives at the UN Human Rights Comission in Geneva.”.157 Additionally, 
“efforts to reintegrate Cuba into the OAS were halted” and also “a proposed joint public health 
project in Haiti was stopped.”158  
In analyzing this period, Mark Entwistle, former Canadian ambassador to Cuba,  stated that 
occasionally, Canada assumes temporarily the “US perspective” on the Cuban issue, and this was 
the case when Chrétien made human rights the center of his visit to Cuba in 1998; this decision 
“affected the entire relationship for many years afterwards.”159 According to Entwistle, the 
Chrétien approach looked like “it could have been crafted at the US State Department." 160 He 
[Chrétien] seemed to have "lost sight of the nature of Canadian policy" and "slipped into the US 
paradigm of dealing with Cuba."161  
Relations between the two states degenerated further when in March 1999, after a Cuban 
court tried and condemned “the four dissidents that Chrétien had appealed to Fidel Castro to free”, 
the prime minister ordered a revision of Canada’s Cuba policy.162 On June 30th of the same year, 
Chrétien told reporters that, “although he was not prepared to abandon constructive engagement, 
‘we have to put some northern ice in the middle of it.’163 
4.2 Assessing the Constructive Engagement Strategy 
While Canada had prided itself on its stated policy of “constructive engagement”, 
particularly as it identified the country as having a policy different from the Americans, there were 
nevertheless many critics who challenged the claims associated with the strategy.   
 One of them is, the historian Robert Wright, who “sees the differences in Canadian and 
American policies as largely superficial.”164 He argues “that Canadian and American Cuba policies 
in the 1990s shared the premise that liberal democracies in North America (and elsewhere) ought 
to be prodding the Cubans forcefully in the direction of liberal reforms.”165 In Wright’s view, 
“constructive engagement” was a “hedging policy” because “the policy was always positioned to 
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look mainly towards the future, that is, to a ‘post-Castro’ future of liberal political and economic 
reforms.”166 In the end, however, he believed that “[c]onstructive engagement has failed... but 
engagement has not.”167 
Although Kirk and McKenna believe in the policy of “constructive engagement”, they 
stress the important role of the US in the Canada-Cuba relationship as they point out the “‘US 
factor’ plays a fundamental role domestically and externally both in Ottawa and Havana in shaping 
Canada-Cuba relations.”168 Meanwhile, for Entwistle Canada’s relationship with Cuba is "a subset 
of the Canada-US relationship."169 Canadian-Cuban relations are influenced by a complex 
“interplay” of “domestic politics and foreign policy”. "Sometimes it involves assessment of the 
impact of Cuba policy on the critical Canada-US relationship" and "sometimes it involves 
responding to domestic constituencies and interests groups, who have expectations of what Canada 
should be doing in Cuba." 170 He believes that “calculated engagement” a term used by Dennis 
Molinaro is a more appropriate way of defining Canadian foreign policy towards Cuba.171  As he 
notes, the “Cuba card” has been used in domestic politics to mark the difference with the US  to 
assert Canadian autonomy  and "to demonstrate and prove the independence of Canadian foreign 
policy vis-à-vis the United States, when that is deemed useful or necessary." 172 Within this 
historical context “constructive engagement”, which is Ottawa’s official approach to Cuba since 
the 1990s, should be seen as functional to the hegemonic agenda. In this policy, Canada (unlike 
the hegemon) puts into practice a foreign policy that is based on negotiation and cooperation, 
where the final purpose is the same as that of the dominant power, to promote and protect the 
system of global capitalism (although using a soft approach) against those states that contest and 
challenge it. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
THE HARPER GOVERNMENT’S FOREIGN POLICY TOWARDS CUBA 
The preceding chapter presented an historical overview of Canada Cuba relations.  The 
present chapter constitutes the core of the analysis and addresses the research question posed in 
the Introduction: that is whether the Harper government’s policy toward Cuba represents a 
radical turning point from the approach of “constructive engagement” implemented by previous 
governments.  The response to that question is that under the Conservatives, Canada’s Cuban 
policy has diverged significantly from the “constructive engagement” strategy of previous 
administrations.  
To demonstrate its claims, this chapter is organized into three sections.   In the first, 
Harper’s government policy towards Cuba will be compared with some of the patterns observed 
historically in relations between the two countries. These patterns include a) the dynamics of 
the triangular relationship between Canada-US-Cuba), b), the impact of the issues of identity, 
and c) the influence of economic bilateral interests.  
The second section deals with the domestic factors that affect the relationship. It 
discusses how the influence of Ottawa’s foreign policy bureaucracy and the strong focus on the 
human rights issue in Cuba by the Harper government have adversely affected Canada-Cuba 
relations. In this context, it also analyses the adverse impact on Canada’s Cuban policy of the 
Conservative offensive against the civil society organizations as the latter had played a very 
active role in lobbying in favour of engagement with Cuba during previous administrations. 
The final section of the chapter summarizes the main ideas that characterize the Harper 
government’s current policy towards Havana. 
5.1 Harper’s government policy towards Cuba in the context of the historical patterns of 
the bilateral relationship 
        5.1.1 The Triangular Relationship: Harper—the US—Cuba   
In the previous chapter, it was shown that Canada-Cuba relations are not entirely 
bilateral but part of a triangle with the US as the third angle as the latter is a critical player for 
both countries. The dynamics of this triangular relationship implies that for Canada any effort 
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to forge closer ties with Cuba carries with it the potential for frictions with Washington, while 
greater condemnation of the island implies loyalty to its southern neighbour. Under any 
circumstances, the Canadian-US side of the triangle is strategically important. 
Since taking office in 2006, the two consecutive terms of Stephen Harper have coexisted 
with two US Administrations, the last years of the Republican president George W. Bush and 
the whole cycle of the Democrats president Barack Obama. Some Canadian scholars observe a 
greater ideological and political affinity between the policies of the Harper government and that 
of the Bush administration, than between Harper and Bush’s successor, Obama.173  
It is well known that US foreign policy during the Bush years was very assertive in 
consolidating American hegemony on the world stage.  This approach is exemplified in the 
Bush doctrine, which, according to Charles Krauthammer, was based on unilateralism, the war 
on terror, the doctrine of pre-emptive war and the American mission to spread democracy 
throughout the world.174 Influenced by this context, the US policy towards Cuba during that 
period was particularly hostile, with the widening and deepening of the policy of political and 
economic pressures. Academic exchanges, travel,  and the flow of remittances to the island 
were all restricted during the administration of George W. Bush. Moreover,  Cuba was also  
included in the list of enemy countries of the US (those accused of terrorism, of human rights 
violations, of  human trafficking, of having weapon of mass destruction, and of  sponsoring of 
aggressive intelligence actions in US territory, amongst others).175  During the years of the 
younger Bush’s administration, US-Cuba relations experienced one of the worst periods of this 
prolonged conflict.. Interestingly, Harper’s Cuba policy during his first three years, which 
coincided with that his Republican counterpart (2006-2008) and with the beginning of the 
Obama’s mandate (2009), was characterized by an unusual anti-Cuban rhetoric that mirrored 
the rigidities of the US policy towards Cuba.176   
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For example, during this same period, Canada and the US collaborated actively in the 
exclusion of Cuba from the respective Summits of the Americas,177 ignoring  a growing demand 
issued by the rest of the Latin American countries that Cuba be invited to participate. During 
the 5th Summit of the Americas, held in April 2009 in Trinidad and Tobago, Prime Minister 
Harper expressed his hopes that the Cuban government could reciprocate the new openness of 
President Obama to Cuba (the latter’s policy of easing restrictions on travel for family members 
as well as members of academic and religious institutions)178  without referring to the continuity 
of the US embargo.179 Three years later the Canadian Prime Minister showed his 
"unwillingness" to allow Cuba’s participation in the Sixth Summit of the Americas held in 
Colombia in April 2012 and “in any forthcoming summits.”180 As an editorial article in the 
National Post noted, “Stephen Harper stood with President Barack Obama in opposing Cuba’s 
participation in the 2015 Organization of American States summit, for no discernible principled 
reason whatsoever.”181   
It should be pointed out that despite some of Obama’s early initiatives, which in 
substance puts the relationship between the US and Cuba on par with the Clinton era, the 
embargo and the main elements of the isolating and embargoing Cuba continue and, in some 
instances, the pressures have increased. As Bolender noted, “Obama [has] in fact tightened 
certain aspects of the embargo, making it harder for Havana to conduct normal international 
banking transactions, and has increased the amount and frequency of fining international banks 
that do business with Cuba.”182 Some of those measures have an undeniable extraterritorial 
character. For instance, the French bank, BNP Paribas, considered one of the largest in Europe, 
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reportedly was punished with a “mega-fine” of US$8.9 billion for violating the blockade. 183   
Also affected by the extra-territorial dimension of the on-going US legislation are Canadian 
companies and citizens as the Mastercard case illustrates184 In 2007, a subsidiary of the Bank 
of America purchased CU Electronic Transaction Services (CUETS), the principal credit card 
service provider of MasterCard in Canada.  CUETS was thus forced to comply with US law, 
making MasterCards invalid in Cuba and creating a problem for many Canadians who go to 
Cuba as tourists since they cannot use their MasterCards issued in Canada.185   
However, the Harper government did not seek to counter these actions despite their 
consequences for Canadians,. Indeed, despite of the fact that there is Canadian legislation (the 
Foreign Extraterritorial Measures Act, FEMA)186 that can counteracts those external 
interferences,187 the Harper government chose not to invoke it. 
This behavior contrasts with the more active governmental opposition to the US that 
took place in the 1990s against the implementation of the Helms-Burton Bill. As Deonandan 
noted, then, Canada denounced the Helms-Burton legislation “as an infringement on national 
sovereignty, a violation of the rules of the international marketplace and a contravention of the 
terms of existing trade agreements such as the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA)” and adopted a series of countervailing measures to protect its businesses.188 What 
this demonstrates is that Harper is moving away from the stated goals of liberal 
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internationalism. “Although there are still fragments of liberal internationalism in Harper’s 
foreign policy” mainly related to the negotiation of trade agreements and the promotion of other 
rights, the current Conservative government refuses to follow the traditional engagement of 
previous Canadian administrations which all claimed to adhere to the “middle power” 
approach.189 In the case of Cuba, that policy did not bring the expected results of regime 
transformation through soft means. Consequently, it seems to have lost its usefulness under 
Harper as the peculiar Canadian contribution to the consolidation and stability of the capitalist 
hegemonic order.  
The Harper government`s response to this perceived ineffectiveness of liberal 
internationalism is to explore alternative ways for Canada to assert itself on the world stage in 
support of the global capitalist order led by the US.   It aspires to increase and reinforce the role 
of Canada through a more active participation in the security endeavours sponsored by its 
southern neighbor.190 As the engagement of Cuba, constructively or not, belongs more to the 
“liberal internationalist” era that the Harper government wishes to undermine,191 it does not fit 
well with its current foreign policy agenda. This attitude precludes Ottawa from moving beyond 
Washington’s paralysis regarding Cuba, and the result is neglect, inertia and a non-declared 
disengagement from the island. 
Alternatively, pursuing a policy of actively subverting Cuba is not an attractive option 
for Ottawa either. If the US, with its considerably larger economic, military and intelligence 
resources has failed to transform Cuba after almost six decades of isolation, the prospects of 
Canadian success are slim. Besides, the domestic gains of such behavior are not perceptible, 
something that is crucial in the Harper government calculations through the performance of its 
foreign policy objectives. Therefore, the aggressive rhetoric pursued by Ottawa towards 
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Havana, particularly during the first four years of the Conservative administration, and 
sporadically in later years, seems more designed to demonstrate loyalty to the US than to pursue 
an explicit political goal of Canadian foreign policy towards the Caribbean country. 
           5.1.2 The Declining Importance of a Canadian Identity under Harper 
Historically, one of the major factors that have influenced Canada-Cuba relations has 
been the desire by successive Canadian administrations to carve out an identity distinct from 
that of the US.  However, under Harper, this desire seems to have waned as his government 
seeks to follow more closely in the America footsteps. Not only is Canada-Cuba relations 
influenced by the Harper government’s desire to follow more closely in the American path, but 
as was discussed in chapter three, it is also affected by Canada’s sense of identity and self-
image. According to Lana Wylie “[t]he most prominent perception in Canada of Cuba and 
Canadian-Cuban relations is influenced by the Canadian self-image as a good international 
citizen, as a peacekeeper, and as distinct from the US.”192 Some Canadian administrations, 
aware of this prevailing perception in Canadian society, have used the “Cuba card” to 
demonstrate Ottawa’s independence or autonomy from Washington in foreign policy.193 Thus, 
Canadian politicians have exploited “for reasons of domestic political consumption” this 
demonstration of independence -“real and imagined”- from the US to reaffirm the Canadian 
“sense of pride and national identity.”194  
However, under the Conservative government this tendency has lost ground. This new 
trend was seen most recently in the Harper government’s response or lack thereof, to President 
Obama’s announcement on easing of some of the restrictions on Cuba.  Thus far, the Canadian 
government has shown little enthusiasm about this announcement —something one would 
expect if “constructive engagement” were indeed its goal. When Stephen Harper was asked 
about Canada’s role in bringing about this softening, he seemed to want to downplay Canada’s 
actions. He stated, "I don't want to exaggerate Canada's role, we facilitated places where the 
two countries could have a dialogue and explore ways of normalizing the relationship. And that 
is what we did… We were not in any way trying to direct or mediate the talks. We were just 
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trying to make sure they had the opportunity to have the kind of dialogue they needed to have." 
195 The future implications of Obama’s announcements for Canada-Cuba will be discussed in 
greater detail in the epilogue.  
As it was discussed above, the Harper  government has not only distanced Canada from 
the "international good citizen" image projected by the middle power thesis, but he also wants 
to transform the paradigm through which Canadian foreign policy has been 
perceived.196Additionally, his government does not seem as concerned with underlining the 
distinctiveness of Canada with respect to the US. On the contrary, one of the top priorities of 
the current administration is to establish even closer economic, political and security links with 
Washington. In this context, the “constructive engagement” strategy of playing the “Cuba card” 
is not attractive at all and is rather an obstacle in the quest for a deeper alliance with the US.  
Furthermore, it is well known that one of the main priorities of the Harper government 
is to achieve the necessary support within the US to get the approval for the conclusion of the 
last part of the Keystone XL pipeline. This project has been paralyzed for six years due to the 
pressures of ecological organizations and activists, the opposition of some governors and 
politicians (most of them from the Democratic Party) and the reticence of President Obama.197 
Canadian-US diplomacy during the last few years has been marked by constant attempts to 
convince the US President to change his mind on this issue.  Canada’s Cuba strategy can be 
seen as part of a larger campaign to court the US President, and to influence him on the pipeline 
issue. The linkage between Canadian interests, US policy, and the Cuban issue was clearly 
identified by a columnist of the National Post during the assessment of Harper-Obama 
cooperation to exclude Cuba from the Summit of the Americas in Cartagena:  
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In siding with the president on the issue of Cuba, Mr. Harper helped guide events that 
were already trending in Ottawa’s favour. There was little to be gained from isolating the 
president, and much to be achieved by gaining Mr. Obama’s appreciation.198  
 
However, the Keystone XL pipeline project enjoys the sympathy of the Republican 
caucuses in both houses of the Congress to the point that the victory of that party in the US mid-
term elections on November 2014 was considered as a factor that would help Ottawa to 
accomplish its goals with respect to the controversial pipeline.199 In fact, a bill approving 
Keystone XL passed on February11th 2015, 200 although President Obama vetoed it a few days 
later.201  
Coincidentally, it is within the Republican legislators that the policy of isolating and 
embargoing Cuba can count on overwhelming support. Particularly significant is the clout that 
the group of Cuban-American Senators and Representatives can exert in the Congress.202 As 
such, the Harper government cannot risk a weakening of the Republican support at any level of 
the US political spectrum if it desires to accomplish its strategic objectives. Therefore, any   
rapprochement between Ottawa and Havana could entail undesirable consequences for the 
Conservative government’s plans in the US on crucial issues such as Keystone XL. That is 
another reason the “constructive engagement” strategy in playing the “Cuba card” is no longer 
viewed with any enthusiasm by Harper’s camp. 
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Further, Canada, unlike the US, does not have a Cuban constituency that could influence 
Ottawa’s Cuban policy.  However, the Cuban-American lobby and the political ramifications 
stemming from their actions have in some ways an indirect effect on Canadian foreign policy. 
The results of their lobbying in the US are influencing the current Canadian government’s 
stance towards the island. This fact is another confirmation of the triangular character of the 
relationship that was discussed above. 
In sum, , it can be said that the current long-term strategic purposes of Canadian business 
class that Harper so well interprets and represents, are in conflict with a strategy of improved 
Canadian-Cuban relations. 
           5.1.3 The Influence of Economic Bilateral Interests in Canada-Cuba Relations 
Influencing Harper’s Cuba policy is the fact that Canada’s economic interests in Cuba 
have declined over the last decade. Traditionally, economic factors have been considered one 
of the driving forces in Canadian-Cuban relations. Previously, promoting Canadian business 
interests and seizing spaces left by the US companies on the island used to be priorities in 
Ottawa’s Cuba policy. Currently, however, while Canadian investment presence on the island 
is important to Cuba, it has been in relative decline and the companies still active there have 
relatively little clout politically or economically within Canada. Most of them are individual 
investors or small-medium firms trying to seize profits in a high-risk  market. The only 
exception, Sherritt International, which is also the main corporate foreign investor in Cuba and 
which constitutes a very important provider for the island in terms of energy production (gas, 
oil and electricity generation) and exports. Even it is not a major and highly influential 
corporation in the Canadian context  because it ranks a lowly 488th  amongst Canada’s top 500 
corporations. 203   Besides, the enterprise has been experiencing economic difficulties in the last 
few years due to increased investment losses and growing debts derived from investments 
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depreciation and higher income taxes. 204  Hence, there are few Canadian companies with 
interests in Cuba with the capacity to influence Ottawa’s decisions regarding the island.  
Where Canada is putting its focus, apart from the ongoing emphasis on traditional 
Western partners, is in the emerging economies of the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and 
South Africa),205 countries which all have considerable consumer markets and which offer 
enormous opportunities for investments.  The Harper government is pursuing economic ties 
with these states even though politically and ideologically these countries may have political 
systems or espouse political practices that are antithetical to those of the Conservative 
government.  
For its part, even though Cuba has been opening up its economy since the 1990s due to 
a variety of pressures that it is facing, it still does not fit into the categories of countries with an 
investment environment to which large investors would be attracted. Since the 1990s, Cuba has 
been compelled, in large part due to the fall of the Soviet Union, its major ally and source of 
aid, to open its economy to the influence of market forces. However, this opening is taking 
place under very strict control by the government.  Decisions on whether to accept or reject a 
particular investment is based on whether the investment represents a real contribution to the 
country's economy and whether it bring benefits to the population according to the norms of a 
socialist system. The process of economic liberalization has been very gradual as investments 
are rigorously evaluated for their adherence to the above criteria on a case by case basis.   
Recently, the Cuban government introduced a new Investment Law that aims to be more 
flexible to attract increasing foreign investments.206 However, the new legislation still 
maintains, in substance, the concerns on the social and political priorities of the island and it is 
still far away from a neoliberal approach so prevalent in Latin America and so damaging to 
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many countries which have implemented its prescriptions.207 Indeed, the new Cuban investment 
approach will not accept the recent practices of Canadian companies in the area that privilege 
the investor rights over the populations’ interests, thus is highly improbable that the Harper 
government will support the Canadian economic engagement in the island actively under those 
conditions. 
Another factor explaining Harper’s detachment from Cuba has to do with tensions 
stemming from the case of two Canadian businessmen prosecuted in Cuba on charges of 
corruption (bribery, tax evasion and “activities damaging to the economy”).208 The case started 
in 2011 and has been drawn out and protracted due to the peculiar functioning of Cuba’s justice 
system that has been criticized for its lack of transparency.209 Though the conflict has been 
managed discretely at the diplomatic level, it has contributed to the deterioration of the 
investment confidence among Canadian entrepreneurs and provides Ottawa with further 
justification not to engage more decisively with Cuba on economic matters. 
5.2 Domestic Factors Influencing Canada’s Cuban Policy under Harper 
5.2.1 The Focus on the Human Rights Issue 
One distinctive aspect of the Conservative Administration toward Cuba has been the 
“critical tone” on the issue of human rights and democracy. 210 Some scholars have noticed this 
has been the main reason of “acrimony” between Canada and Cuba in recent years. 211 
According to these views, the current government “has allowed the issue of human rights to 
dominate the bilateral relationship with Cuba” due to the ideological orientations of the 
Conservative party and its chief officials in Ottawa.212 Thus, the Canada-Cuba relations have 
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become “hostage to a single issue area”.213 In previous governments, the question of human 
rights was also present and part of the negotiations, but this government has made it the 
“centrepiece” of the bilateral relations.214      
         Some examples of the primacy accorded human rights in the Canada’s policy towards 
Cuba were expressed through several statements made by Harper and other high-level officials 
on different occasions, particularly during the initial years of the Conservative administration. 
In January 2009 before his visit to Cuba Peter Kent, Minister of State of Foreign Affairs for the 
Americas, made provocative statements saying Cuba was a “dictatorship, any way you package 
it.”  215 On April 2009, Kent expressed “encouragement of the release of political prisoners and 
the opening of institutions to democratic practices”.216 Harper himself has castigated Cuba 
particularly in occasion of the different Summit of the Americas and during international visits 
to other Latin American and Caribbean countries.217 The double standards implicit in pursuing 
of the human rights issue regarding Cuba by the Conservatives are very clear. As was mentioned 
in chapter two, the current Canadian government reserves the lecturing on human rights for 
those countries, like Cuba, where there are not fundamental economic interests, while it is 
careful not to lecture nations that represent valuable markets and investment opportunities, but 
which nevertheless are human rights violators such as China and Colombia. However, Harper 
can rationalize his government’s ties with Colombia on the basis that this a democratically 
elected government, despite the country’s human right records. 
5.2.2 Bureaucratic Preferences 
The Canadian bureaucracy has also played a role in shaping the government’s strategy 
towards Cuba.  As Kirk and McKenna wrote, “the traditional, conservative approach toward 
Cuba by officials within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade (DFAIT)” 
has also played into the government’s preferences with respect to Cuba.218 These officials “have 
never been fond of cultivating closer relations with Cuba” and “have been in a strong position 
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to influence Canada’s Cuba policy.”219 The outcome of this situation is an “ideological 
preference for a tougher line on Cuba, deeply rooted deference to Washington, and a 
bureaucratic preference for doing little on the file.” 220 Indeed, the inertia of the bureaucracy’s 
preferences prevails when there is not a clear political will to lead in a concrete direction. Other 
authors point out that the frustration of high-level officials with the lack of changes in Cuba, 
the desire to please Washington and the convergence of the approach of the bureaucracy with 
the ideological orientation of the Harper government is what explain the changes—the move 
away from “constructive engagement” Canada’s Cuban policy. 221    
      5.2.3 The Decline of ‘Counter-Consensus Organizations  
Another factor that arguably has influenced Canada-Cuba relations deals with the 
decline of civil society organizations, precisely those groups, which Pratt has labelled “counter 
consensus.”  As was discussed earlier, the  Harper government has been involved in a deliberate 
offensive against civil society organizations such as NGOs and other institutions with a  
progressive orientation222 that are critical of his administration’s policies. Many of these 
organizations were advocates of a stronger Canada-Cuban relationship.   As Christine Warren 
explains, during the years of Lloyd Axworthy as Foreign Affairs minister, relations with Cuba 
were more amicable as they benefitted from the involvement of many civil society groups, 
scholars, universities and think tanks that were connected to his office.223 These groups 
included, among others, the United Church of Canada, the Canadian Foodgrains Bank, Oxfam 
Canada, Ottawa-Cuba Connection, Canadian University Service Overseas (CUSO), and the 
Jesuit Centre for Social Faith and Justice. Canada’s Cuban policy in the 1990s was influenced 
by  the interest of many of these organizations in a closer relationship with Cuba.224 Their 
activism, for example, led to social mobilization across Canada against the Helms-Burton Bill, 
and they exerted an undeniable impact on the implementation of Canadian legislation (Foreign 
Extraterritorial Measures Act--FEMA) to counter that intrusive US initiative.  
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Although the influence of these organizations lost some ground after Axworthy departed 
from the Department Foreign Affairs Department in 2000, the Harper government has been 
aggressively  focused on cancelling any vestige of the Axworthy legacy in Canadian foreign 
policy since it took power.225 Without doubt, the heyday of Canada-Cuba relations was during 
the Axworthy era. 
5.3 Concluding Observations 
Despite the less than amicable nature of the Canada-Cuba relations under Harper, since 
2011 there has been a less contentious tone in the relationship. Two high-level Canadian 
officials, Diane Ablonczy, foreign minister for the Americas226 and Foreign Minister, John 
Baird, 227 visited the island in 2011 and 2013 respectively. Both visits took place in an 
atmosphere of dialogue without lecturing. However, this climate was contrasted by Harper’s 
negative remarks towards Havana in the context of the Summit of the Americas. 228    
This apparent shift is not related to a substantial change of policy towards Cuba, but it 
is more linked to what some authors have noticed as an adjustment in Canadian foreign policy 
after the initial years of the Conservative government with more emphasis on the promotion of 
trade and investment interests abroad than on democracy and human rights promotion.229 This 
less “ideological” period of the Conservative administration has not implied a perceived 
improvement in the relations with Havana either.  Since Cuba is not an important economic 
target for Ottawa and since the island is a very sensitive issue on the political landscape of the 
US, the preferred outcome from the Canadian perspective is the neglect of the relationship. 
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This chapter demonstrated the ways in which the Harper government’s policy towards 
Cuba differed from that of previous administrations; it represented a shift away from the idea 
of “constructive engagement”. To illustrate the differences, three patterns in the relationship 
were analyzed: the dynamics of the triangular relationship Canada-US-Cuba, the issue of a 
distinct Canadian identity from that of the Americans, and the influence of economic bilateral 
interests. When measured against the previously common patterns that defined Canadian 
foreign policy towards Havana in earlier decades during the past fifty years, the Harper 
government shows a significant departure from the stance of previous administrations in almost 
all areas. This chapter has tried to explain the motivations for this shift. 
An overarching trend witnessed under Harper, is that the search for a closer alliance 
with the US in political, economic and security terms, in order to safeguard vital Canadian 
interests, has predominated over any other consideration. In this context, the relations with Cuba 
have been affected negatively. Relatedly, the chapter has demonstrated that in practice the 
Harper government has distanced itself and Canada from the substance of the policy of 
“constructive engagement”. This outcome is also a consequence of the fact that “constructive 
engagement” belongs more to the “middle power” approach through which Canada has been 
perceived traditionally to perform its foreign policy. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONCLUSION 
Ottawa’s Cuba policy has been an important aspect of Canadian foreign policy in the 
last five decades. This research has tried to analyze whether this continues to be the case under 
Harper’s government or whether the latter represents a radical turning point from the approach 
of “constructive engagement”, which had been implemented by previous governments. This 
thesis holds that under the Conservatives led by Prime Minister Harper, Canada’s Cuban policy 
has evolved significantly different from preceding administrations. 
The predominant view of Canadian foreign policy after the end of WWII is that of a 
“middle power” playing a constructive and pacifistic role on the world stage, supporting 
international institutions and performing its foreign policy through quiet diplomacy. This 
archetype is the prevalent image through which other countries and Canadians themselves 
perceive the country’s behavior at the world stage. However, as noted in the first chapter, the 
substance of such a model is that Canada became a “core state” of the international system in 
the context of an “American-led hegemonic order” where it has acted as “facilitator and 
mediator” to help to defuse potential conflicts that could undermine the stability of the global 
order.230  
The “constructive engagement” that was adopted in the 1990s as the official Canadian 
policy towards Cuba should be seen as functional to the hegemonic agenda. According to this 
strategy, Canada (unlike the hegemon) puts into practice a foreign policy based on negotiation 
and cooperation, where the final purpose is the same as that of the dominant power, to promote 
and protect the system of global capitalism (although using a soft approach) against those states 
(in this case Cuba) that contest and challenge it. 
Nonetheless, under Harper the orientation of Canadian foreign policy in general, and 
consequently of Canada’s Cuba policy have evolved towards a different path. There is a 
combination of external (systemic) and domestic factors that explain this.  Firstly, on one hand, 
as was discussed in chapter two, the international situation after the developments of September 
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11, 2001 led to a feeling of shared vulnerability among developed capitalist countries and thus 
there was an instinctive need to close ranks with the hegemon and leading security guarantor. 
In addition, the salience of new non-liberal emergent powers in the last decade (BRICS) have 
spurred a deeper subordination to Washington because what is at stake is the survival of the 
long established Western dominance over the international economics and politics. This trend 
is not only perceptible in Canada, but also in other developed states such as the European Union, 
Australia, and Japan. 
On the other hand, even though the hegemonic system sets the place, the role and the 
limits of capitalist country within it according to its relative power, there is some space for 
human agency. In this case study, it was seen how the actions, ideology and political preferences 
of relevant politicians, and particularly of prime ministers or foreign ministers, can turn the 
course of Canadian foreign policy in diverse directions provided that certain boundaries 
imposed by the imperatives and strategic needs of the international system are not trespassed. 
In the case of the Harper government, the preference for a neoliberal economic approach 
and the need to appeal to some specific constituencies of his party have led in a rightist 
international stance that has openly departed from those of his predecessors. The 
implementation of these ideas in the country’s foreign policy is possible because they also 
reflect in substance of the preferences of the Canadian dominant class, of which Harper and his 
party are loyal representatives.  
Consequently, under the leadership of Prime Minister Harper Canada has attempted to 
improve its overall relations with the US through closer cooperation in the political and defense 
contexts at the international level, and to avoid frictions on conflicting issues that could affect 
the relationship. The primary goal of this approach is to secure the access of Canadian 
companies to the US market, particularly in the strategic energy sector and offset the impact of 
border issues on economic and physical flows between both countries. 
In defining the profile of Canadian foreign policy towards Cuba under Harper the 
analysis of historical patterns of this relationship discussed in chapter three (the influence of 
economic bilateral interests, the dynamics of the triangular relationship Canada-US-Cuba, and 
the impact of the topic of identity) were especially helpful. When tested against these patterns 
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the Harper administration showed a significant departure from the stance of previous 
governments regarding Cuba.  
Cuba’s “constructive engagement” policy belongs more to the period of the so-called 
middle power model of Canadian foreign policy, where Ottawa preferred to follow a more 
diplomatic strategy to achieve the same long-term objectives as the US-- the reinsertion of Cuba 
as a liberal democracy into the world capitalist system. This is why the Harper administration 
(that is focused on shifting paradigms) seems not particularly interested in “constructive 
engagement” even though the policy has not been abandoned officially.  
The combination of this rationale with the incidence of the economic, identity, US 
influence and agency factors analyzed above create the conditions for Cuba not to be a relevant 
priority in today’s Canadian foreign policy, which seems driven by inertia and neglect regarding 
the Caribbean country. To conclude, this thesis remarks that the substance of the actions of the 
Conservative government towards Cuba until now indicate a practical disengagement even 
though it is not recognized explicitly.  
6.1 EPILOGUE 
On December 17, 2014, US President Barack Obama, and Cuban President Raul Castro 
surprised the world with parallel announcements of policy changes intended to improve US-
Cuban relations. Diplomatic ties with the opening by each country of embassies in the other 
and the easing of travel and commerce restrictions were among the main aspects of the 
statements.231 This development has created high expectations about the future of bilateral 
relations between the two countries; however, many obstacles still remain. Among them, the 
lasting US embargo on Cuba, the lifting of which depends on the US Congress which is 
dominated by the Republicans who mostly oppose this presidential initiative to foster closer 
ties with the island.  
One of the most surprising aspects of these new developments is related to the role 
played by Canada; it was one of the locations of the secret negotiations between Cuba and the 
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US. This fact is interesting due to the frosty relations between Ottawa and Havana during the 
last eight years. However, although some press analyses have tried to highlight the protagonist 
role of Canada in this process, 232 as was discussed above, Prime Minister Harper  downplayed 
Canada’s role in the process, stating that Canada only provided the place and for the 
conversation at the requests of the US and Cuba without mediating or taking part in the 
dialogue.233  Harper himself, in an interview with CBC,234 seemed to go out of his way to 
portray a distant and low profile role for Canada in this transformative event, seeming to 
confirm his ideological prejudices towards Cuba and  his desire not to rile those in the 
politicians in the US  who oppose the President’s move. 
The preliminary conclusion of all this is that the arguments made in this investigation 
regarding Canadian foreign policy towards Cuba under Harper maintain their validity, despite 
the new US-Cuban developments.  Deeper and wider changes in US-Cuban ties are some 
distance away as they are dependent on Congress, which will soon be in the throes of a new 
election. The outcome of this contest will have implications for the future relations between the 
two, and also for Canada-Cuban relations.   This new scenario will create both opportunities 
and challenges for Canada, particularly in the economic field as Entwistle noted,235 but an 
analysis of this future context is beyond the scope and the original purposes of this research. 
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